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PASSENGER SERVICE: THE SUNSET CASE,
DAWN OF A NEW ERA OR MONUMENT TO
THE OLD?
Steady discontinuances of trains, reduction in patronage, and the
absence of meaningful response from any governmental body foretell

the imminent demise of railroad passenger service in the United
States.' Despite contrary protestations, this result can be avoided by

the application of presently existing laws if the agency concerned
makes the policy choice to assert these laws. Attempts to isolate the

source of the current railroad passenger problem* are predictably
circular. The railroads blame both the reduced patronage allegedly
caused by public preference for airlines, buses, and private

automobiles and the loss of mail transport contracts2 for the
elimination of passenger service.' Public officials blame railroad

management's preferences for freight traffic and resultant efforts to
reduce passenger service for its deterioration.4 The Interstate

Commerce Commission5 has played a major role in the decline of
passenger service since the 1958 congressional action authorizing
1. See Hearings on H.R. 12084, H.R. 744, H.R. 785, H.R. 3112. H.R. 521, H.R. 9168,
H.R. 14170, H.R. 13347, H.R. 13352, H.R. 13832, H.R. 14661, and HJ. Res. 52 (and related
bills) Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-31, at 178 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]; Lyon, Is This Any Way to Ruin a Railroad?, 19 AM. HERITAGE 52 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Lyon]. But see Hearings267,272,285.
2. The circularity of the reduced rail passenger service problem is particularly accentuated
by the process by which the Railway Post Office was eliminated. Before the reduction trend
began, mail revenue had produced one-third of passenger train revenue; by the end of 1968
railroads had lost over $ 100 million from the reduction in service. See Hearings368, 372. Such
a loss certainly seems ample justification for cutting back service, but it has been argued that
reduced passenger service precipitated reduced mail service because of the loss of essential
connections for mail delivery. See Hearings153,239, 309. But see Hearings 149, 322.
3. See Hearings243,272,285,288,306,456.
4. See Lyon 52-53, 57, 78-79, 83; Wright, The Nuisance of Passengers,204 THE NATION
275-76 (1967).
5. The ICC has been the principal federal regulatory body concerned with railroad
transportation since 1887. See Delisi & Bristline, CoordinatedTransport-Isa Single Federal
Regulatory Commission Needed 36 ICC PRAC. J. 1326-27 (1969); Lyon 84.
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interstate railroad carriers to circumvent recalcitrant state railroad
commissions and go directly to the ICC to obtain permission for
interstate service discontinuances.6 To create evidence in support of
such discontinuance petitions before the ICC, 7 railroads allegedly
have intentionally downgraded service to decrease passenger
patronage.
The ICC first sustained such an allegation in 1966, holding that
discontinuance petitions would be denied where intentional
downgrading was established The Commission refused to accept
the carrier's proof of decrease in revenue passengers as justification
for service termination because of the railroad's practices of
eliminating particular trains from published schedules and denying
their existence to the public, closing ticket offices two and one-half
hours before departure time, and providing one passenger coach per
train and replacing such coach with a caboose as a passenger
conveyance. Despite all these obstacles 12,000 passengers traveled
the route in question during a twelve-month period in 1964-1965.10
The Commission ordered the service to be continued," announcing
that "[w]henever it appears . . . that a carrier has deliberately
downgraded its service in order to justify discontinuance of a train
irrespective of the actual or potential needs of the traveling public,
the Commission will order the service to be continued."'" But
ordering continuance of downgraded, inadequate service is far from
an adequate remedy for the passenger since the order merely
preserves, for at most a year, 3 grossly inadequate service for the
consumer. The railroad may then return and reargue its case,
6. Interstate Commerce Act § 13a, 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1964), amending 49 U.S.C. § 13

(1952); see 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3457, 3467-69; Thorns & Laird, Derailing
the Passenger,36 ICC PRAc. J. 1121 (1968).

7. See Southern Pac. Co. Discontinuance of Trains Nos. I and 2 Between Los Angeles,
Calif., and New Orleans, La., 333 I.C.C. 794 (1968); Hearings 147.48; Lyon 57, 79, 83;

Wright, supra note 4.
8. Southern Pac. Co. Discontinuance of Trains Nos. 39 and 40 Between Tucumcari, N.
Mex., and Phoenix, Ariz., 328 I.C.C. 360,364-65 (1966).

9. Id. at 364.
10. Id.

I1. Id. at 366.
12. Id. at 365. Although the Commission purported to follow an earlier case, Pennsylvania
R.R. Discontinuance of Passenger Service, 320 I.C.C. 319 (1963), the later verbalization of
the principle is considerably more lieral than the PennsylvaniaR.R. pronouncement requiring
that the intentional downgrading has deprived the public of "a necessary and well patronized
service." Id. at 323.
13. Interstate Commerce Act § 13a(l),49 U.S.C. § 13a(l) (1964).

Vol. 1970:529]

RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE

bolstered by declining patronage caused by the maintained
inadequate service. If the railroad has preserved the status quo and
has not intentionally downgraded since the last discontinuance
proceeding, the absence of the prohibited practices would
presumably allow discontinuance based on the current statistics. It
is the premise of this comment that the victim of such a practice
clearly needs a remedy whereby a railroad can be compelled to
provide adequate service on the trains that it must run.
This quest for a remedy for intentional downgrading of passenger
service is a meaningful effort only if passenger service is worth
saving. The subsequent analysis is based not only on such a
presumption but on the views of many public officials, consumer
representatives, and commentators that a sound national passenger
transportation system, and in some instances a sound regional
system, is dependent upon the continued presence of railroad
passenger service1 Two substantial reasons for the preservation of
railroad passenger service are the reduction of highway and airport
congestion, and the consequent noise and air pollution, and the
prevention of further esthetic and ecological destruction caused by
highway and airport construction. Such contributions to the
preservation and enhancement of life go far in justifying the cost of
maintaining and expanding rail transportation capabilities.
The search *involves an analysis of the Interstate Commerce Act
and ICC power therein since the Commission is the appropriate
government instrumentality for analyzing and solving the problem
of intentional downgrading. ICC jurisdiction can be traced from
three basic facts. First, since all the major carriers move in interstate
commerce, reliance upon state agencies would seem to be
inappropriate under basic constitutional law concepts. 6 Second, the
14. See, e.g.. Hearings 1, 123, 128, 132, 137-38, 162-63, 178, 493-95. See generally 2
CENTER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, THE PUBLIC INTEREST

AND THE ICC X-I-9-XI-15 (preliminary draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as TRANSPORTATION
STUDY].

15. TRANSPORTATION STUDY XI-9-XI-15. The following additional reasons have been
enunciated in support of the necessity for saving railroad passenger service: the promotion of
regional economic development, the reduction of door-to-door travel time between certain
major cities in "megalopolitan" areas, the reduction of national passenger transportation
costs because of less expensive real estate investments vis-a-vis highways and airports, and
the provision of transportation for those psychologically adverse to flying. Id.
16. State regulation of railroad passenger service standards is closely analogous to
regulation of railroad passenger safety standards. Both, in general, create an undue burden
on interstate commerce because of the need for national uniformity. Such service items as
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ICC rather than the judiciary is the appropriate federal
instrumentality because of its broad regulatory power in the railroad
sphere 7 and because of its theoretical capability of flexible, effective,
and timely response to current transportation problems. Basic to this
greater flexibility and timeliness is the Commission's authority to
investigate the activities of common carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act, to institute inquiries on its own motion as if there
had been a complaint or petition, and to seek criminal penalties, if
necessary, 8 rather than wait for the initiation of private actions.
Moreover, agency enforcement on its own motion removes the
burden of litigation from the private party. The quality of such
enforcement is enhanced by the Commission's experience, expertise,
and investigative and research capabilities.
Better policy should be produced by utilization of the
Commission's quasi-legislative power to conduct hearings and
investigations. Although ultimate resort for enforcement must be to
the courts,1 the carriers are prone to accept Commission orders
since good relations with the Commission are essential to their
business. Unfortunately, a case by case analysis of the relative
advantages of enforcement of applicable passenger service law
through the Interstate Commerce Commission or solely by the
courts is impossible since legal action in this area has been extremely
scheduling, the type of cars and number provided, and the operating condition of cars are not
subject to effective state regulation because of potentially conflicting and mutually exclusive
standards. Supreme Court hostility to state regulation of interstate railroad passenger safety
was clearly evidenced in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Court

held that Arizona's limits on the length of interstate trains operated to "[prevent] the free
flow of commerce by delaying it and by substantially increasing its cost and impairing its

efficiency." Id. at 779. Predictably, the Court would look with equal disfavor upon similar
regulations in the service area. The absence of Supreme Court enthusiasm for state regulation

of interstate railroads contrasts sharply with its views of state regulation of motor car traffic
on its highways, described by the Court as "a legislative field over which the state has a far
more extensive control than over interstate railroads," as an area "peculiarly of local
concern," and as "akin to quarantine measures, game laws, and like local regulations of
rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, with respect to which the state has exceptional scope for the
exercise of its regulatory power, and which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even
though they materially interfere with interstate commerce.

. . ."

Id. at.783. A key distinction

emphasized by the Court is that "[u]nlike the railroads local highways are built, owned and
maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions." Id.
17. See 1 I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSIQN 4-6 (1931) [hereinafter
cited as SHARFMAN].
18. Interstate Commerce Act, §§ 12(1) & 13(2), 49 U.S.C. §§ 12(l) & 13(2) (1964). See I
SHARFMAN 7.
19. See generally I SHARFMAN 285-87.
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limited. The advent of organized consumer groups recognized as
representatives of passenger interests should increase passenger
litigation. It is, therefore, vital that the utility of the Commission in
responding to such issues be publicized. Third, the question of
adequate service is mooted if a train is discontinued. Therefore, since
the Commission shares original jurisdiction over interstate
discontinuances with state regulatory agencies z a litigant would be
expected to seek its aid in preserving service on trains not yet
discontinued, particularly in light of the significance of intentional
downgrading in the Commission's evaluation of a discontinuance
petition 2 ' In light of these several considerations, it is the purpose
of this comment to demonstrate that the ICC, not the judicial
system, is the appropriate remedial agency and does have the
requisite power. There will be no analysis of the recently created
Federal Railroad Administration since that organization,
subordinate to the Department of Transportation, is essentially a
long range planning body for national railroad policy, and this
comment will focus on more immediate remedies. If passenger
service disappears now, future planning will be superfluous.
THE RAILROADS' COMMON LAW DUTY

Passenger railroads are generally subject to the duties of
common carriers since they hold themselves out as ready to
transport all persons properly presenting themselves to be carried.P
Based on their invitation to the public, common carriers and,
therefore, passenger railroads have a duty imposed by law to provide
20. See Interstate Commerce Act § 13a,49 US.C. § 13a (1964).
21. See note 12 supra. Even an unsuccessful attempt at blunting downgraded service might

discourage future discontinuance petitions since the record would often reveal intentional
downgrading which, as noted earlier, is fatal to a discontinuance petition.
22. See generally OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

MANUAL 1969-1970 at 386-88 (1970). Since the Federal Railroad Administration was
organized to supervise existing railroad programs transferred to the Department of
Transportation and none of the potential passenger service provisions were transferred,
Department of Transportation Act § 6(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(e) (Supp. IV, 1969), one can
infer that Congress did not intend for the Administration to regulate passenger service
standards. See generally 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3397,
3416.
23. See Webster v. Fitchburg R.R., 161 Mass. 298, 299, 37 N.E. 165, 166 (1894); B.
WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS § 188 & n.3 (1911) [hereinafter cited as WYMAN];
Boring, Some Legal Aspects of Common Carriage,17 I.C.C.

cited as Boring).

PRAC.

J. 255 (1949) [hereinafter
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such services reasonably necessary for safe and comfortable
transportation 2 The imposition of such a duty is further justified
by certain public advantages enjoyed by the railroad common
carrier. First, railroads, as other quasi-public bodies, are protected
from some competition and are often delegated the right to exercise
eminent domain power in the specific manner directed by the
appropriate state legislature." This latter benefit has enabled
railroads to obtain essential rights-of-way. Since railroads have been
provided with this advantage, ostensibly for the public good,
fundamental fairness dictates that they reciprocate by providing
adequate and reasonable service. Second, since railroads at their
inception received large federal and state land grants for rights-ofway, they arguably have a moral duty to provide the public
reasonable and adequate service.P In light of the common law duty
to provide adequate facilities, the presumed incorporation of that
duty within the Interstate Commerce Act, and the supposed broad
statutory power to regulate railroads given the ICC, 28 the
Commission predictably could and should require railroads to
maintain adequate passenger facilities. But in the recent SunsetA dequacies case,' the Commission proved again that the obvious
response is not always the eventual conclusion when enforcement
statutes are interpreted.
In that case, a number of state public utility commissions
petitioned the ICC to institute an investigation under section 12(l)p
24. See Atlantic Coast R.R. v. Powell, 127 Ga. 805, 809, 56 S.E. 1006, 1008 (1907);
Murray v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 66 Conn. 512, 519, 34 A. 506, 507 (1895); Hardenberg v. St.
Paul, M.&M. Ry., 39 Minn. 3,4,38 N.W. 625,626 (1888).
25. Boring 256. See generally Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 14, 22 (1881);
Caldwell v. Richmond & Danville R.R., 89 Ga. 550, 15 S.E. 678 (1892); Sandford v. Railroad
Co., 24 Pa. 378,380 (1855).
26. See Hearings 129-30; cf.Hearings 140. But see Hearings246-47. A controversy exists
as to whether railroads have not already paid the United States for the land by absorbing
losses from special land grant rates for transporting United States government personnel and
property. As noted in the Hearings above, the land grants may affect congressional propensity
to subsidize railroads further.
27. See note 36 infra and notes 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
28. See SHARFMAN 4-6.
29. Adequacies-Passenger Service-Southern Pac. Co. Between California and Louisiana,
335 I.C.C. 415 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Sunset-Adequacies]. See generally
TRANSPORTATION STUDY XI-3 and Appendix XI-1; Laird & Thoms, End of the Line, 15 LoY.
L. REv. 270-71,275,279 (1969).
30. "The Commission shall have authority, in order to perform the duties and carry out
the objects for which it was created, to inquire into and report on the management of the
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of the Interstate Commerce Act into the service provided by the
Southern Pacific on its "Sunset" passenger train from Los Angeles
to New Orleans. 1 The state commissions contended that the carrier
had consistently downgraded service as a part of a systematic plan
to create evidence in support of discontinuance petitions before the
ICC.2 The railroad argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction
over railroad passenger service;3 the trial examiner believed that the
Commission had jurisdiction and recommended that it be
exercised. 3 The Commission recognized that the Interstate
Commerce Act encompassed the duty to provide adequate passenger
service but held that it lacked power to enforce that duty The
meaning and correctness of the Sunset-Adequacies case and its
present and future impact on the parties to the proceeding cannot
be determined without an analysis of the statutory context of the
decision. Many issues of statutory interpretation were raised in the
case; others of critical importance were not. The two principal
inquiries are the nature of the substantive duties imposed on
interstate carriers and the enforcement of these duties.
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT: SUBSTANTIVE DUTIES

Duty to Provide Transportation
A cursory examination of the Interstate Commerce Act reveals
numerous substantive provisions that might be utilized for the
delineation of a duty to furnish adequate passenger service. Section
I (4),38 providing that "[i]t shall be the duty of every common carrier
subject to this Chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon
reasonable request therefor

. . .

'

was analyzed by all parties in

the Sunset-Adequacies proceeding. The state and passenger groups
business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter... :'Interstate
Commerce Act § 12(I),49 U.S.C. § 12(l) (1964).

31. See Trial Examiner's Report at 2-3, Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. 415 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Trial Examiner's Report].

32. Id. at 2.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
See note I ll infra and accompanying text.
See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
Duty to furnish transportation and establish through routes; division ofjoint rates.

It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter to provide and
furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor .

. .

. It shall be the duty of

every such common carrier establishing through routes to provide reasonable facilities
for operating such routes. ...
Interstate Commerce Act § 1(4),49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1964).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:529

argued that it granted the ICC jurisdiction to regulate the quality
of passenger service;37 the railroads asserted that the section provided
no enforcement power.8 However, the railroads conceded that this
section encompasses their common law duties to their passengers,"
a proposition somewhat novel in light of the Act's own definition
of "transportation":
The term "transportation" as used in this chapter shall include locomotives,
cars, and other vehicles, vessels, and all instrumentalities and facilities of
shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or
implied, for the use thereof, and all services in connection with the receipt,
delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventilation, and refrigeration or
icing, storage, and handling ofproperty transported."

Although this definition could include the carriage of passengers, it
apparently" excludes services connected with passengers transported,
yet elsewhere the Act expressly applies to the "transportation of
persons or property." 42 Since no direct precedent supported the
37. Brief for California Public Utilities Commission at 5, 47, Sunset-Adequacies, 335
I.C.C. 415 (1969); Brief in Reply to Exceptions for National Association of Railroad
Passengers as Amicus Curiae at 4-9, Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. 415 (1969).
38. Brief for Southern Pacific Company taking Exception to Examiner's Report and
Recommended Order at 16, Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. 415 (1969).
39. 335 I.C.C. at433,440-41.
40. Interstate Commerce Act § l(3)(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a) (1964). In analyzing section
1(4) in their study of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Center for Study of
Responsive Law, popularly called "Nader's Raiders," cited Chicago v. Atchison, T.&S.F.
Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958), as precedent for section 1(4) applicability to the transportation of
persons as well as property. TRANSPORTATION STUDY appendix XI-l, introductory material,
third textual note. Quoting directly from the case, the authors conclude that the "Supreme
Court in 1958 ruled that Section 1(4) 'not only authorize(s) the railroads to take all reasonable
and proper steps for the transfer of persons and property between their connecting lines, but
imposes [impose in original] affirmative obligations on them in this respect.'" Id.. citing 357
U.S. 77, 86. The quoted material does not justify such an inference since the Court was stating
its analysis of two other sections of the Interstate Commerce Act besides section 1(4),
including a section applicable on its face to passenger service, and cited only two freight cases
to support its conclusion. An inference drawn from three statutes is certainly not necessarily
applicable to one of the statutes by itself. Chicago v. Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. is weak precedent
for the applicability of section 1(4) to passenger transportation.
41. Southern Pacific originally argued that "transportation" encompassed only the
transportation of property, citing the fact that section 1(4) included the phrase "transportation
of passengers or property" from 1920 until such language was deleted in a later amendment
to the Interstate Commerce Act. See Brief for Respondent at Ii, Sunset-Adequacies, 335
I.C.C.415 (1969).
42. "Special rates and rebates prohibited.
This section forbids unequal charges for like and contemporaneous service in the
'transportation of passengers or property.'" Interstate Commerce Act § 2, 49 U.S.C. § 2
(1964).

Vol. 1070:5291

RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE

application of section 1(4) to passenger service, the term
"transportation" could easily have been interpreted to exclude the
transportation of passengers. The concession by the railroads
that their common law duties toward passengers were included in
section 1(4) was most charitable since it supplied a vital link in any
attempt to employ that section as a grant of power to the ICC to
order adequate passenger service. All parties and the Commission
agreed that the substantive law of section 1(4) was directly
applicable to the intentional downgrading of passenger service and
the resultant loss of comfort by passengers.P
Duty to Provide Service Required by Public Convenience and
Necessity
Section 13a authorizes carriers in certain situations to petition
the ICC directly to allow the "discontinuance or change, in whole
or in part, of the operation or service of any train . . . . The
Commission must apply the standards of "public convenience and
necessity" and "undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce"
to the particular operation or service to determine whether it shall
order continuance or restoration or acquiesce in the discontinuance."
The Commission will order a continuance if the carrier has
intentionally downgraded service in seeking to justify a
discontinuance. Although section 13a is, therefore, effective in
preventing ultimate success in the total elimination of passenger
service through intentional downgrading, its positive value is limited
because of the requirement that the railroad approach the
7
Commission before its jurisdiction under 13a can be exercised
Still, if a railroad that has intentionally downgraded seeks
discontinuance of such a train and the ICC orders "restoration" or
"continuance" of service, it is arguable that such an order compels
the carrier to return to full and adequate service. Moreover,
"

43. In Sunset-Adequacies the trial examiner found that the railroad had violated its section
1(4) duty by the failure to provide sleeping-car accommodations and appropriate eating
facilities for first class passengers. Trial Examiner's Report 49. See text accompanying note

31 supra.
44.
45.
46.
47.

InterstateCommerceAct § 13a(l),49 U.S.C. § 13a(l) (1964).
Id.
See note 12 supra.
See Interstate Commerce Act § 13a(l), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(l) (1964); Trial Examiner's
Report 24. See generally Thoms & Laird, supra note 6, at 1132.
48. Cf Thorns & Laird, supra note 6, at 1127-28.
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elimination of pullman and diner service and the deletion of public
schedules would seem to be a "discontinuance or change, in whole
or in part, of the operation or service of any train."" Although a
railroad would certainly not publish such acts in a petition for
discontinuance, they are actual changes subject to a restoration
order by the ICC.s Therefore, a restoration order would necessitate
the return of such service to a reasonable level. Discontinuance
jurisdiction logically includes coverage of such "partial
discontinuances" as downgrading of service on a particular train
since a whole-here the total discontinuance of a train-normally
includes the sum of its parts-here the piecemeal elimination of
particular services. Since 13a was designed to correct the
inadequacies of the "complete abandonment" section,5' 1 one would
expect it to apply to partial discontinuances not reached by the
abandonment proviso. 2 If a restoration order would require a return
to adequate service, a railroad desirous of full discontinuance would
be risking the ability to continue inadequate, downgraded service by
such applications. Discontinuances would be inhibited by such an all
49. Interstate Commerce Act § 13a(I),49 U.S.C. § 13a(l) (1964):
50. See H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1958); S. REP. No. 1647, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1958). Both the Senate and House Reports indicated a desire to grant
the Interstate Commerce Commission optional exclusive jurisdiction over interstate train
service. Although specific power to regulate discontinuances of stations, depots, and other
facilities was considered but excluded from the final bill, the House Report included schedule
changes within Commission jurisdiction. Arguably, the Commission's optional exclusive
power is applicable to all but the most local of railroad activities. Since the state commissions
had a general power over operational train changes, the Commission inherited such power
through 13a. Clearly, Congress did not desire simply to eliminate state regulation but to offer
a federal procedural substitute for the state procedure, the substantive regulation remaining
essentially the same apart from the extreme local situation.
51. "[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a
line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained
from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity
permit such abandonment.
... Interstate Commerce Act § 1(18), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)
(1964). Section 1(18) was of limited utility since it was only applicable to the "complete
cessation of operations by a carrier over a given line." Project, FederalAdministrative Laip
Developments- 1969, 1970. DUKE L.J. 67, 179. Discontinuances and changes of train schedules
were under exclusive state jurisdiction until the passage of 13a, which offered a federal
alternative to the state procedure. H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1958). See
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3468.
52. See generally Public Convenience Application of Kansas City S. Ry., 94 I.C.C. 691,
691-92 (1925). Since 13a was drafted to provide an alternative to state regulation and state
commissions could prohibit partial qualitative discontinuances, it is reasonable to infer that
the federal alternative is applicable to such discontinuances. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 40-321 (1956); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 556 &761 (West 1956).
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or nothing proposition. But 13a is only a negative remedy, dormant
apart from a railroad's petition to the ICC,3 and was not employed
directly in Sunset-Adequacies since that case was not a
discontinuance proceeding. Those desirous of preserving railroad
passenger service need a positive, affirmative tool if their efforts are
to be effective.
Duty to FurnishSafe andA dequate Car Service

Section 1(11) of the Act specifies that "[i]t shall be the duty of
every carrier by railroad subject to this chapters' to furnish safe and
adequat6 car service . . . -55 "Car service" is defined in section
1(10) to
include the use, control, supply, movement, distribution, exchange,

interchange, and return of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles used in the
transportation of property, including special types of equipment, and the

supply of trains,by any carrier by railroad subject to this chapter!i

This provision was. interpreted early in Wisconsin v. Chicago &
North Western Railway57 where it was the railroad, seeking to avoid
state control, which claimed that the ICC had sole jurisdiction over
interstate railroad passenger service because the "supply of trains"
term, an amendment to the original section, conveyed such
authority s The ICC disagreed, holding that "[i]t seems clear that
paragraph 10 of section 1 was enacted to enable us to facilitate and
expedite the movement of property."'" This position has been
directly followed, or at llast indirectly accepted, in a line of cases
extending to one as recent as 19640 and was accepted by the
Commission with no new analysis in Sunset-A dequacies.
53. Cf. 1970 DUKE L.J.,supra note 51, at 179.
54. Title 49 of U.S.C. contains twenty-one separate chapters or primary divisions, and five
of the chapters encompass specific "Parts" of the Interstate Commerce Act. Railroad
regulations are contained in Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, §§ 1-40, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1964).
55. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(11),49 U.S.C. § 1(119(1964).
56. Id. § 1(10) (emphasis added).
57. 87 I.C.C. 195 (1924).
58. Id. at 195-96.
59. Id. The Commission recognized congressional authority to regulate passenger trains but
found that such jurisdiction had not been vested in the ICC, the car service provision being
no impediment to state regulation of interstate passenger service. Id. at 195-98.
60. Prevention of Rail-Highway-Grade-Crossing Accidents Involving Ry. Trains and
Motor Vehicles, 322 I.C.C. 1, 48 (1964); Commutation Fares Between Washington and
Virginia, 231 I.C.C. 397, 402 (1939). Train Service on Line of N. Pac. Ry., 112 I.C.C. 191,
193 (1926) (dictum). See generally 2 SHARFMAN 260.
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However, contrary precedent does exist. In Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway v. La Prade the railroad argued that a state law
limiting the length of both passenger and freight trains was in
conflict with provisions of federal legislation, among which was the
"car service" sections. 1 The district court held that the
Commission's power to regulate the supply of trains necessarily
included the power to prescribe the number of interstate trains the
carrier could operate and that the Arizona statute, regulating both
passenger and freight trains, was an attempt to occupy the same field
as that of the car service provisions!2
Supportive of ICC power over passenger service under the car
service provision is the conclusion of Professor I.L. Sharfman in his
treatise The Interstate Commerce Commission that a primary
governmental coneern is that "just and reasonable rates and
practices be maintained for the pullman service

. . ."

and that

"towards this end ample authority has been expressly conferred
upon the Commission."" Solid support for this position can be
found in section 1(3)(a) where the term "common carrier" is defined
to include "sleeping-car companies"" and the word "carrier" is
equated with "common carrier." Thus, the definition of "car
service" as the "supply of trains, by any carrierby railroad" would
encompass "sleeping-car companies" and, therefore, the
requirement of the car service provision, section 1(11), that "every
carrier by railroad subject to [Part I shall] furnish safe and adequate
car service

. . .""

could apparently be applied to pullman carriers.

Unfortunately, for this analysis, case precedent for ICC regulation
of pullman service is very limited. In a 1915 case the Commission
did order a railroad to provide better service for pullman passengers
but applied only broad generalizations as to what was just and
reasonable, failing to cite any provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act.' 7 In none of the other three cases cited by Sharfman as
61. 2 F. Supp. 855, 859-61 (D. Ariz.), revd on otiergrounds sub noma.Exparte La Prade,

289 U.S. 444 (1933).
62. 2 F. Supp. at 857, 860. The Commission itself recognized such precedent in Heflin v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 278 I.C.C. 737, 740 (1950), when section 1(10) was cited as authority
for certain ICC service orders affecting railroad passenger service.
63. 2 SHARFMAN 86.
64. Id. referring to Interstate Commerce Act § 1(3)(a),49 U.S.C. § l(3)(a) (1964).
65. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(3)(a),49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a) (1964).
66. Id. § 1(10) (emphasis added).
67. Rules and Regulations Governing the Checking of Baggage on Combination of Tickets,
35 I.C.C. 157 (1915).
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supporting jurisdiction over the adequacy of sleeping-car service8 did

the Commission affirmatively exercise jurisdiction 6 ' and in one of

them the Commission specifically reserved consideration of whether
it had jurisdiction over a state utility commission's complaint
demanding the restoration of certain pullman service!" It must be

admitted that although the Commission's jurisdiction over adequate
pullman service is supported in sections 1(3) and 1(11), there is no

strong case precedent for it. Since precedent and statutory language
are inconsistent as to the full breadth of the car service sections, the
Commission in Sunset-Adequacies could have justified a broad
interpretation including passsenger service within the term "car
service" as a form of "supply of trains." Passenger service
proponents would have an effective remedy, if the Commission could
enforce the duty to furnish safe and adequate car service!' Such an
interpretation, although arguably technically incorrect, 2 would be
consistent with a broad interpretation of declared congressional
intent to preserve a national rail system adequate to meet the needs
of commerce 3 Such an application of interpretative flexibility is
68. See 2 SHARFMAN 88-89, n.165.
69. Harden v. Pullman Co., 120 I.C.C. 359 (1926); East Crosby v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 112 I.C.C. 239 (1926); Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma v. Atchison, T., & S.F. Ry.,
25 I.C.C. 120 (1912). In two of the above cases, involving racial discrimination in pullman
service, it was implied that if adequate evidence of undue prejudice was provided the
Commission could act under section 3(l), noted below, and possibly other provisions.
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter
to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district
.. . or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject
[such clauses] to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. . . . Interstate
Commerce Act § 3(l),49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1964).
70. Corporation Comm'n of Okla. v. Atchison, T., &S. F. Ry., 25 I.C.C. 120, 122 (1912).
71. See notes 181-95 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commission's
power to enforce the car service sections.
72. Since "car service" is limited in section 1(10) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1(10) (1964), to the "transportation of property" and "supply of trains" and
evidence exists of congressional intent to restrict l(10)'s applicability to property, a strong
argument can be made that 1(10) is not applicable to passenger service. See Railroad
Comm'n. v. Chicago& N.W. Ry., 87 I.C.C. 195 (1924).
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress...
73.
to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic
conditions in transportation and among the several carriers . . . to the end of
developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water,
highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the
provisions of this Act (chapters 1, 8, 12, 13, and 19 of this title), shall be administered
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appropriate and essential if an administrative agency is to remain
effective in regulating a rapidly changing technological, social, and
political milieu since regulatory statutes are a product of past
compromise and, therefore, if applied strictly, will be of limited
assistance in solving the novel problems of the future!,
Duty to Avoid UnreasonablePreferentialTreatment of Traffic
A carrier is forbidden by section 3(1)
to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality,

port... or any particulardescription of traffic, in any respect whatsoever,
or to subject ...any particulardescription of traffic to any undue or

unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . ..

The term "traffic" is not defined in the Act,7 but an expansive
definition of "traffic" to include the movement of both persons and
goods has been employed by the United States Supreme Court both
before and after the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.77 The
word "description" normally connotes "sort" or "kind." 8
Applying the above definitions to section 3(l), the statute must be
interpreted to impede unreasonable preferences between different
kinds of transportation of persons and property. Since passenger
traffic and freight traffic would thus appear to be two "descriptions
of traffic,"' and the intentional downgrading of passenger traffic in
and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy. Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. [introductory material before § 1](1964).
See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
74. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 16-18, 50
(1965); Jaffe, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. RE. 858,864 (1963).
75. Interstate Commerce Act § 3(l),49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1964) (emphasis added).
76. "Traffic" has been defined as the "subjects of transportation on a route, as persons
or goods." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1667 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
77. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 508, 320 (1913); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co.
v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 217 (1894); McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104, 108 (1890);
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 702 (1880). But see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 (9
Wheat.) 1,4 (1824). Pomeroy in his treatise on constitutional law broadly defined "traffic"
as follows: 'The subject-matter of intercourse or traffic may be either things-goods, chattels,
merchandise-or persons." J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 378 (10th ed. 1888) (emphasis added).
78. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 390 (unabridged ed.
1967).
79. The Supreme Court has used the term "passenger traffic" to describe the movement
of passengers by rail; traffic balances have been defined as the "balances of money collected
in payment for the transportation of passengers and freight:' McCall v. California, 136 U.S.
104, 109 (1890); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. United States & Mexican Trust Co., 225 F. 940,
946 (8th Cir. 1915).
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favor of freight traffic would arguably constitute an "undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage" for one over the other,
particularly where a railroad's discontinuance petition has been
rejected, the section 3(1) duty directly applies to a situation such as
the Sunset-Adequacies case. Strangely, this contention was not
raised in the case by any of the parties nor considered by the
Commission even though the section had been previously applied by
the Commission and the courts to passenger service issues.
Miscellaneous Support for Commission Power to Require Adequate
PassengerService
Federal-State Division of Power. Section 1(17)(a) disclaims an
intent to preempt state power to require "just and reasonable freight
and passenger service for intrastate business."8 Such a disclaimer
would be superfluous unless the Commission was deemed to have the
affirmative power to require reasonable interstatepassenger service.
Further indication of broad Commission power is provided by the
subordination of state power over intrastate freight and passenger
service to "any lawful order of the Commission made under the
provisions of [Part I]."82 Though the quoted portion of 1(17)(a) is
primarily an exposition of states' rights as to railroad regulation and
not a direct source of authority, it clearly implies that such authority
will be found elsewhere in the Act. One should also note that
l(17)(a) implicitly excludes the states from the regulation of
interstate passenger service,13 thus leaving a regulatory void unless
the Commission can regulate such service.
National TransportationPolicy. In 1940 Congress amended the
Interstate Commerce Act by inserting an introductory statement of
"National Transportation Policy" which declared the broad goal of
"developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation
system by water, highway, and rail,as well as other means, adequate
8
to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States .,
80. See notes 196-205 infra and accompanying text.
81. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(17)(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1(17)(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. See notes 146-60 infra and accompanying text.

84. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. [introductory material before § 11 (1964)
(emphasis added). See generally TRANSPORTATION STUDY appendix XI-i (text accompanying
footnotes 16-17), citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397,
409-13 (1967) and Schaffer Transp. Co. v. U.S., 355 U.S. 83, 87 (1957) which respectively
apply the National Transportation Policy as the "yardstick" for measuring ICC actions and
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Moreover, it specified that "[a]ll of the provisions of this Act shall
be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above
declaration of policy."" The Sunset-Adequacies' hearing examiner
inferred from the term "commerce," which has been defined to
include the transportation of persons," that Congress' intent
"embraces all the means and instruments by and in which traffic is
carried on, and that all these may, therefore, be regulated.""7 Since
the Commission is ordered to enforce and administer the Act based
on such a broad policy statement, its narrow, strict approach in the
Sunset-Adequacies case appears inconsistent. Clearly, Congress
desires that doubtful railroad issues be resolved in favor of broad
action to "preserv[e] a national transportation system by . . .rail
"s88

An Act to Regulate Commerce. The Supreme Court recognized
the broad scope of the Interstate Commerce Act long before the
passage of the statement of National Transportation Policy. From
the simple title of the Act, "an act to regulate commerce,"'" the
Court concluded that "in advance of an examination of the text of
the act, [it would] be reasonable to anticipate that the legislation
would cover, or have regard to, the entire field of foreign and
interstate commerce, and that its scheme of regulation would not be
restricted to a partial treatment of the subject."' 0
Other courts and authorities have also found broad Commission
power in the railroad transportation area derived from various
statutory provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act and
combinations thereof. A state supreme court, in a mandamus action
to compel a railroad to construct an umbrella or canopy shed for
the protection of passengers, concluded that the 1920 amendments
to the Interstate Commerce Act "placed the transportation system
of the country completely under the supervisory control of the
Interstate Commerce Commission" and that the Commission
ultimately defined adequate facilities." But, citing section 1(17)," the
employ it to integrate specific Interstate Commerce Act sections to remedy a lack of express
authority.
85. Id.
86. See cases cited note 77 supra.
87. Trial Examiner's Report 9.
88. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. [introductory material before § 1] (1964).
89. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
90. Texas& Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 211 (1896).
91. State v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 104 So. 602,604 (Fla. 1925).
92. InterstateCommerceAct § 1(17)(a),49 U.S.C. § 1(17)(a) (1964).
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partial disclaimer of jurisdiction to regulate intrastate passenger
service, the same court rejected the railroad's argument that the state
could not require just and reasonable passenger service for intrastate
business, recognizing such state power except as inconsistent with a
lawful order of the Commission! 3 The court then supplied the
dictum that the Commission could not require improved passenger
stations!' Contradictory language is provided by the district court
opinion in United States v. Pennsylvania Railroad,95 involving
railroad control over washroom facilities and the application of the
Defense Production Act's 6 price levels to charges for such services.
The pourt concluded that the Interstate Commerce Act
imposed an affirmative duty upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to
provide adequate railway service for the people or the United States. Under

the powers conferred by this Act the Commission was authorized to require
operation . . . at a loss if those facilities were necessary in the overall

requirement of an adequate railway service for the people of the United
States.P

The Court further concluded that:
the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission has permitted local
authorities, state and municipal, to regulate sanitary conveniences in station
and terminal facilities is not in derogation of the powers conferred upon the
Interstate Commerce Commission by Congress as affecting common
carriers'

Though the broad statements of ICC power are certainly dicta, it is
interesting that in determining that washroom facilities at passenger
stations were an integral part of the railroad's operation and that
rates charged for such services were then exempt under the Defense
Production Act provision exempting "[r]ates charged by any
common carrier

. .

"

the court cited 49 Code of Federal

Regulations, section 10.227,. 9 which specifies a carrier's proper
accounting for station maintenance expenses as part of its overall
operating expenses. 100 If the Commission can specify in its
93. See 104 So. at 604.
94. Id. at 605 (dictum). The court could find no authority in the Transportation Act of
1920 for the Commission to exercise such power. The weakness of this dictum is heightened
by the fact that no party to the litigation had argued for such Commission power.
95. 105 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (dictum).
96. Defense Production Act of 1950 §§ 409, 706, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2109, 2156 (1964)
(terminated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 2166 (1964)).
97. 105 F. Supp. at 618 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 619.
99. Id. at 616,619.
100. 49 C.F.R. § 288 (1968).
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regulations the proper accounting procedures for handling the
"'expenses, taxes, equipment rates and joint facility rents" for
passenger service, 01 it would not appear to be a major extension of
power for the ICC to require adequate service to go along with
adequate accounting for such service, and the district court
obviously believed that the Commission had broad authority over
railroad passenger service. In analyzing the jurisdiction over a
junction between two railroad lines, the Supreme Court again
recognized broad Commission power by commenting that "[i]n
matters relating to the construction, equipment, adaptation and use
of interstate railroad lines . . . Congress has vested in ,the
Commission the authority to find the facts and thereon to exercise
the necessary judgment." ' The Commission itself recognized its
broad power in 1915 when, in response to a complaint by throughtrain passengers concerning the requirement to recheck baggage and
secure pullman reservations in Washington, D.C., it ordered such
practices stopped and described them as "obviously unjust and
unreasonable"
and "annoying
and often prohibitory
inconveniences."' 0 3 Considering contemporary passenger problems,
such an issue seems minor, but the ICC's comment that no carrier
may "lawfully withhold provision for incidental services so
constantly and universally in demand as those at which the proposed
rules are directed"'' 4 is directly applicable to contemporary issues of
adequate passenger service. There is substantial precedent for broad
interpretation of the Act and the Commission's jurisdiction under it.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CARRIERS'

DUTIES TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE

PASSENGER SERVICE

The foregoing analysis offers numerous examples of substantive
law that would be applicable to the issue of adequate passenger
service, but it leaves unanswered the vital question of the source of
enforcement of such substantive law.
101. 49 C.F.R. § 1242.01 (1968).
102. Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Jackson & Eastern Ry., 271 U.S. 244, 250 (1926). A

commentator has observed that the "powers now conferred upon the Commission are so broad
as to embrace all of the traffic of interstate carriers." 2

SHARMAN

221.

103. Rules and Regulations Governing the Checking of Baggage on Combination of
Tickets, 35 I.C.C. 157, 159 (1915).

104. Id

Vol. 1970:529]

RAIL PASSENGER SER VICE

Enforcement of the Duty to Provide Transportation
The Southern Pacific in Sunset-Adequacies denied intentional
downgrading and argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to
institute the requested investigation,0 5 asserting that Commission
jurisdiction over passenger service existed only when the railroad had
petitioned for discontinuance. 6 The trial examiner concluded not
only that the ICC had jurisdiction under section 12(1) to institute
the investigation and had authority under section 1(4)107 to "exercise
jurisdiction and control over passenger-car and passenger-train
service operated in interstate commerce . . -"I but also that
existing sub-standard passenger service 0 9 conditions justified the
exercise of such jurisdiction on motion of the Commission or upon
complaint by a member of the general public or by a state regulatory
agency." 0 Proclaiming the ICC to be the "guardian of the public
interest in matters relating to interstate commerce," the trial
examiner recommended that the Commission exercise its authority
under section 1(4) by requiring all interstate passenger trains to
observe certain minimal standards within thirty days."' The specific
findings made were that the railroad's section 1(4) duty was violated
by the failure to provide sleeping-car accommodations and
appropriate eating facilities for first class passengers."'
The Commission's action implies its rejection of the trial
examiner's fundamental principle that "[tihe Interstate Commerce
Act, like the Constitution of the United States, is a vibrant organ
which must readily respond to the stimulus of current need."" 3
Though the ICC found a duty to provide adequate passenger service
105. Southern Pacific asserted that the investigation was improper because no violation of
a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act had occurred, the Commission had no authority
to conduct an adversary hearing under section 12(1), no carier had filed a petition under
13a(l), and sections 1(4) and 1(11) were inapplicable to passenger service. Brief for Southern
Pacific Co. at 4-13, Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. 415 (1969).
106. Trial Examiner's Report 3.
107. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(4),49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1964).
108. Trial Examiner's Report 49.
109. The trial examiner commented in his report that, "[1l]ike gold mining of bygone days,
the sand and gravel have been washed from the pan in a rushing stream of discontinuances,
infrequent service, broken connections, lack of service facilities, inconsiderateness, too slow
transit time, and the options of air, bus and automobile travel." Trial Examiner's Report 49.
110. Id. at 11.
Ill. Id. at41,43.
112. Id. at 49.
113. Id. at6.
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under section 1(4) and a right in the passenger to have reasonable
service, it found itself without jurisdiction to enforce such a duty and
complementary right.' It specifically rejected the provision of
section 12(1) that the ICC has power to enforce the Act" 5 as
authority for enforcement of the duty imposed by section 1(4),
pointing out first that some sections of the Interstate Commerce
Act"' are not enforceable under section 12(1) because of specific
enforcement procedures detailed in other provisions of the Act.
Moreover, it noted that the Supreme Court had already decided that
the courts rather than the ICC had the authority to enforce the
section 1(4) duty"' and that other regulatory agencies also lacked the
authority to enforce rights and duties contained within their
originating legislation."' The Commission also emphasized state
regulation of passenger service as justification for its narrow
interpretation of Commission power under the Act.2 0 The majority
did proclaim its intention to seek legislation granting the ICC
authority over the adequacy of rail passenger service,' a pledge at
least partially consummated by the introduction of H.R. 1417022
three weeks after the decision in Sunset-A dequacies.
Commissioner Tierney, in his vigorous dissent, argued that such
congressional aid was unnecessary since the Commission had the
requisite jurisdiction to require reasonable service.'2 He pointed out
the carriers admission that their common law responsibilities were
incorporated into section 1(4) and attempted to distinguish the
majority's case authority for court enforcement of section 1(4)2 on
the grounds that it concerned a lack of ICC power to compel
additional equipment rather than to regulate the use of general
equipment. 25 Tierney cited Commission enforcement of the
comparable provision in the Motor Carrier Act and indicated that
114. 335 I.C.C. at424, 437.

115. "The Commission is authorized and required to execute and enforce the provisions of
this chapter.'InterstateCommerce Act § 12(l),49 U.S.C. § 12(l) (1964).
116. E.g.. id.§ 1(18).
117. 335 I.C.C. at 421-22, citing Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1937).

118. 335 I.C.C. at 423-24, citing United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 242 U.S.208 (1916).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

335 I.C.C. at 424-25.
Id.at426-28.
Id.at 437.
H.R. 14170, 91 st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), discussed in note 211 infra.
Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. at 440-51.
242 U.S. 208 (1916).

125. 335 I.C.C. at 433,440-41.
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section 3(4),126 the Interstate Commerce Act's prohibition against
discrimination between connecting lines, had been enforced by the
no express power of enforcement was contained
Commission though
27
statutes.
in the
Tierney also relied upon several fundamental principles of
administrative law to support his view that the ICC had the
necessary jurisdiction. First, he asserted that "[t]he whole trend of
decisional law has been towards confining the areas of
transportation law in which the courts may act unaided by prior
determinations of the Commission and enlarging the areas that
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine must first come to the
Commission for its determination. ' 1 28 He supported the trial
examiner's broad interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act
rejecting the application of rigid stare decisis in administrative law
because the "very purpose [administrative law] serves is to be able
to flexibly respond to new and changing circumstances.' ' 2 Tierney
emphasized the Act's broad language that the national
transportation policy is to preserve transportation by rail adequate
to meet the needs of commerce,130 and he acknowledged the
competence of the Commission to determine the reasonableness of
passenger service since it already had to apply such a general
standard in ruling on discontinuances under section 13a(1)13 1 and in
applying section 15132 of the Act. 3 In summary, it was inconceivable
126. All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, according to their
respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange

of traffic between their respective lines and connecting lines

. . .

discriminate in their rate, fares, and charges between connecting lines .

and shall not
. .

. Interstate

Commerce Act § 3(4),49 U.S.C. § 3(4) (1964).
127. 335 I.C.C. at 445-46.
128. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).

129. Id. at 449.
130. The National Transportation Policy is quoted in note 73 supra.
131. Interstate Commerce Act § 13a(1), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(l) (1964). This section

authorizes interstate carriers whose rights to change or discontinue the operation of any train
are subject to state regulation to file a notice of discontinuance or change with the
Commission, make proper notice within each state, and then to make such discontinuance or

change subject to Commission order. The Commission can thereupon order a hearing and, if
it finds that continuance of service is required by public convenience and necessity, order
continuance or restoration of service for a period not to exceed one year.
132. "Determination of rates, routes, etc.; routing of traffic, disclosures, etc." This section

authorizes the Commission "to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable"
rates or fares.Id. § 15.
133. 335 I.C.C. at 450-51.
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to Tierney that Congress intended the ICC to be impotent to enforce
the duties encompassed within section 1(4).1u
The majority in Sunset-Adequacies-in finding that section 1(4)
of the Act encompassed a duty to provide adequate passenger service
while rejecting ICC jurisdiction to enforce that duty"'-relied
heavily on United States v. Pennsylvania Railroaa 11wherein the
ICC, pursuant to a shipper's request, had ordered the railroad to
cease and desist from refusing to furnish tank cars. The complaint
in the latter case having been brought under section 1(4) of the Act,
the Supreme Court on appeal was required to interpret the 1906
amendments, which had added the provision concerning the "duty
of every common carrier" to "provide and furnish transportation
upon reasonable request therefor .... 13The Commission had
previously recognized the existence of a common law duty to provide
refrigerator cars, apparently based on the development of public
reliance on the availability of such cars, but had denied any
jurisdiction to order compliance with that duty and suggested that
redress must be sought in the courts.' s Thus it was argued that in
the 1906 amendments Congress had enacted the duty in order to
provide for ICC enforcement, but the Court rejected this argument
after examining the legislative history and concluding that an
identical duty to provide transportation existed before the
amendments' passage." 9 Having erroneously concluded that both the
original Act and the amendment encompassed the duty,." the Court
could easily hold that in the absence of'any change the ICC's
previous denial of enforcement power prior to the amendments
should not be disturbed. But since the ICC's pre-amendment
decisions had lacked statutory support for the duty,"' such holdings
are easily distinguishable from the post-amendment situation in the
Pennsylvania Railroad case. Since the common law duty needed no
134. Id. at 457.
135. Id. at 424-37.
136. 242 U.S. 208 (1916).
137. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 1,34 Stat. 584.

138. Charges for the Transportation and Refrigeration of Fruit, 10 I.C.C. 360, 373 (1904).
139. 242 U.S. at 222-24,226-27.

140. The original Act contained no specific duty to furnish transportation. Such a duty was
added in the 1906 amendments, Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584.
Consequently, Justice McKenna's conclusion is inaccurate.
141. See Charges for the Transportation and Refrigeration of Fruit, 10 I.C.C. 360 (1904).
See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
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legislative enactment to be enforceable, congressional action in
placing the common law duty to provide reasonable transportation

within the Interstate Commerce Act would be totally superfluous
and extremely odd unless Congress desired the Commission to

enforce the duty under its power in section 12(1) to enforce the
railroad provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.4 2 But the

majority concluded "that the remedy was in the courts and that the
amendment of 1906 was not intended to and did not change the
remedy.' 4 3

Rejection of Commission jurisdiction has not been universal,
however. Before the Pennsylvania Railroad decision the Supreme

Court, invalidating on statutory preemption grounds a Minnesota
statute imposing a duty to deliver cars for interstate commerce,
proclaimed that remedies indeed existed under the Act for violating

the duty to furnish transportation and that one could elect to
complain before the ICC or bring his action in court

44

If section

142. Interstate Commerce Act § 12(l),49 U.S.C. § 12(1) (1964); cf.242 U.S. at214.
143. 242 U.S. at 227. In cases following PennsylvaniaR.R. the Commission accepted the
interpretation limiting enforcement of section 1(4) to the judiciary. In Jacksonville Port
Terminal OperatorsAss'n v. Alabama, Tenn. & N. R.R. it held that "It]he enforcement of
the duties imposed by section 1(4), except as entrusted to us by other provisions of statute,
rests with the courts and not with us." 263 I.C.C. 111, 116 (1945). In Oliver Manufacturing
Supply Co. v. Reading Co., 297 I.C.C. 654 (1956), a shipper sought a cease and desist order
from the Commission based on an alleged failure to maintain adequate and reasonable
transportation schedules. Again, the Commission refused to enforce 1(4), following the
Jacksonville case. Id. at 658. The incongruity of the concept that a duty "imposed" by the
Interstate Commerce Act cannot be enforced by the Interstate Commerce Commission was
argued in Sunset-Adequacies, where the Commission rejected the provision of section 12(1)
that the ICC has power to enforce the Act, see note 30 supra, as authority for enforcement
of the duty imposed by section 1(4). The Commission pointed out that some sections of the
Interstate Commerce Act are not enforceable under 12(1) because of specific enforcement
procedures detailed in other provisions of the Act, 335 I.C.C. at 421-22, citing Powell v.
United States, 300 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1937), that the Supreme Court had already decided that
the courts rather than the ICC had the authority to enforce the section 1(4) duty, id. at 42324, citing Pennsylvania R.R., and that other regulatory agencies also lacked the authority to
enforce rights and duties contained within their originating legislation. Id. at 424-25. This
viewpoint is unsatisfactory when the broad statement of Commission enforcement power in
12(1) is contrasted with the absence of specific direction in the Act for enforcement by other
means. ICC enforcement authority is declared in broad, clear language in section 12(1): "The
Commission is authorized and required to execute and enforce the provisions of [Part l]
.... " 49 U.S.C. § 12(!) (1964). Several provisions are not enforceable by the Commission,
qualifying section 12(I), but these provisions for court enforcement are expressly indicated in
the statute. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10(l)-(3) (1964). Since no such express qualification or authority
for court enforcement of section 1(4) exists, the reasonable inference is that 12(1) provides for
Commission enforcement of the 1(4) duty.
144. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426,
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1(4)'s expression of duty was merely reiteration of the common law
duty and an affirmance of the common law remedy, it would be
surprising if it preempted a state statute providing a remedy for the
same act. This decision was certainly not adequately distinguished
in Pennsylvania Railroad despite the Court's attempt to formulate
a different question of law: Whether a Minnesota law requiring
certain standards in furnishing transportation had been preempted
by section 1(4)'s duty rather than whether the ICC had jurisdiction
to enforce section 1(4)'s duty to provide reasonable transportation.,
But both questiofis involved the determination of the full breadth
and impact of section 1(4). Present reliance on this earlier decision
is not destroyed by the attempt to distinguish it in the Pennsylvania
Railroad opinion.
Of particular interest is the Commission's deference to state
regulation in Sunset-Adequacies. Although both the states and the
Commission agree that the states are unable to regulate interstate
passenger service effectively,"' the Commission still believes that new
legislation granting the jurisdiction that it claims it lacks would
"preempt . . . the field now occupied by the States."'4 7 One is
immediately struck by the incongruity of a state presently
"occupying" a field wherein it admittedly offers no effective
regulation. But the Commission relied heavily in Sunset-A dequacies
on its interpretation of congressional deference to state regulation,
considering it
thus apparent that in its approach to Federal regulation of passenger train
service, Congress recognized that the States have long occupied the field in
considerable depth and it chose not to disturb the situation except to the
minimal degree necessary to deal with specific problems considered to have
become Federal in scope. For the most part, it has left intact the system of
passenger train regulation by the States."'
Such deference has received the blessing of the Supreme Court
in a case where a trustee in bankruptcy had circumvented a state
hearing on his proposal to abandon 88 passenger stations
and obtained relief in a federal district court.' The Court denied the
434-35 (1913). The Court cited section 9 of the Act, which offers a party aggrieved by an
action of a common carrier a choice between suing for damages in a federal district court or
complaining to the Commission.
145. See 242 U.S. at 234.
146. See 335 I.C.C. at415,416,418.
147. Id. at418.
148. Id. at 427.
149. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939).

Vol. 1970:529]

RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE

existence of such a federal court remedy apart from express statutory
support, stating that "this court has disfavored inroads by
implication on state authority and resolutely confined restrictions
upon the traditional power of states to regulate their local
transportation to the plain mandate of Congress."'-" But the impact
of this decision is limited by the fact that passenger stations are
physically more "local" in nature than other aspects of interstate
passenger service and the fact that the Court was definitely
impressed by the expertise of the state agency versus the judgment
of the single judge of the district court 51 It is extremely questionable
whether the Court would defer to state regulation of other aspects
of interstate passenger service such as adequate schedules, provision
of dining cars, and adequate sleeping accommodations, particularly
if the regulation was by an expert federal agency.
State regulation of such interstate subjects is directly negated by
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens52 that "[wihatever subjects of [the Commerce Power] are
in their nature national or admit only of one uniform system . ..
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by congress.' 5 3 The Court contrasted such national
subjects with those demanding diversity in regulation because of
"local peculiarities."'5' Local peculiarities are hardly pertinent or
dominant considerations vis-A-vis dining cars, pullman cars, general
cleanliness of all cars, or adequate interstate scheduling, rendering
Cooley strong precedent for exclusive federal power over interstate
passenger service.
Subsequent to Cooley, the Supreme Court invalidated the
application of a Louisiana antidiscrimination law to an interstate
carrier by water, holding that the state law conflicted with the
exclusive power of Congress. 55 The significant point was made that
the state statute would influence the carrier's management decision
throughout the interstate journey.' Uniformity in passenger service
and freedom from conflicting state regulations were the factors
150. Id.at 84.
151. Id.at 86,89.
152. 19 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).

153. Id.at 152.
154. Id.at 153.
155. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
156. Id. at489.
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necessitating nonenforcement of the state statute and the finding of
exclusive federal power over interstate passenger service.'57
The necessity for uniformity in the determination of the
adequacy of interstate passenger service is manifest. Interstate
commerce would be directly inhibited if railroads had to respond to
different regulations and different concepts of adequacy each time a
train crossed a state line.15 In short, "commerce

. .

. between the

States, which consists in the transportation of persons and property
between them, is a subject of national character, and requires
uniformity of regulation.""' Even if one could successfully argue
that Congress has been silent as to federal regulation of passenger
service and that such silence constitutes adoption of state regulation,
state incapacity to regulate plus state desire for Commission
action " negate any necessity or appropriateness in applying the
concept of concurrent jurisdiction to the instant problem. Even the
rail carriers, as exemplified by their support of the passage of section
132,6' would not be expected to opt for state regulation, which
would only place them in the constant dilemma ofresponding to
numerous disparate and potentially conflicting standards. ICC
reliance in Sunset-Adequacies on the traditional congressional
deference to state regulation cannot withstand close analysis, the
tradition itself being extremely suspect constitutionally. Such a
traditional regulatory pattern should not have inhibited the
Commission in broadly and flexibly interpreting its statutory
authority.
157. Id. The broadest statement supporting the exclusion of state regulation is found in
Railroad Co. v. Heusen where the Supreme Court stated in an action involving the
transportation of-cattle into a state: "This court has heretofore said that inter-state
transportation of passengers is beyond the reach of a State legislature," 95 U.S. 465, 470
(dictum); accord, Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 281 (1872) (dictum), and
concluded that a state "may not interfere with transportation into or through the State,
beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection." 95 U.S. at 472.
One commentator concluded as early as 1935 that "[i]n large measure the problem of dual
control has been solved by giving to the federal government a virtually complete occupancy
of the fields of rate, finance, and service regulation of interstate railways." Lindahl,
Cooperation Between the Interstaie Commerce Commission and the State Commissions In

Railroad Regulation, 33 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1935) (emphasis added). Although the
commentator may have been equating "service" with "car service" under the Act, his general
conclusion is required by the commerce clause. State regulation of interstate rail carriers is
inconsistent with the commerce clause mandate and with any effective regulation.
158. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
159. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196,204 (1885).

160. 335 I.C.C. at 416.
161. See note 50 supra.
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AdditionalSupportfor Commission Enforcement of Section 1(4)
Motor CarrierAct. The Motor Carrier Act has a provision,
analogous to section 1(4), establishing a duty to provide just and
reasonable rates and services6 2 which has been held as to rates to
be a criterion for administrative application, not a justiciable legal
right.6 3 Rejecting an attack on ICC power under the Motor Carrier
Act in an earlier case,6 4 the Supreme Court refused to accept the
argument that an express delegation of power was always required
for agency action, holding instead that it would be unreasonable for
draftsmen of agency acts to consider every specific evil that might
arise. In fact, the Court felt that agencies were created to apply
expert knowledge to industry conditions "which members of the
delegating legislatures [could] not be expected to possess."'165 If the
Court's evaluation of administrative knowledge is accurate, it would
appear unreasonable to expect courts to possess the knowledge
necessary for the enforcement of adequate standards for railroad
passenger service.
Federal Aviation Act. On numerous occasions the Civil
Aeronautics Board has found airline passenger service inadequate
and ordered the carriers to provide adequate service under a
provision declaring it "the duty of every air carrier to provide and
furnish interstate and overseas air transportation . . . upon
reasonable request therefor and to provide . . . safe and adequate
service, equipment, and facilities in connection with such
transportation," language strikingly similar to section 1(4) of the
Interstate Commerce Act.' Of course, air passenger carriers are
significantly stronger financially than their rail counterparts because
of generally higher passenger patronage and the power of the CAB
to subsidize airmail compensation for carriers in "need" beyond
162. "It shall be the duty of every [such] common carrier . . . to establish, observe, and
enforce just and reasonable rates, charges, and classifications, and just and reasonable
regulations and practices relating thereto. . . ." Motor Carrier Act § 316,49 U.S.C. § 316
(1964).
163. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
164. American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309 (1953).
165. Id. at 310.
166. Federal Aviation Act § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1964); see. e.g., National
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 300 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Capital Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 281 F.2d
48 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Fort Worth Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 803 (1960); Flint-Grand Rapids
Adequacy-of-Service Investigation, 30 C.A.B. 1120 (1960). The second portion of § 1374(a)
contains language similar to the "car service" provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.
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payments by the Postmaster General. 7 CAB willingness to enforce
the Federal Aviation Act duty to provide transportation may be a
direct function of carrier capability to respond to such directives." 8
Otherwise, such an inconsistent response by two agencies, the ICC
and the FAA, lacks a definite rationale.
PrimaryJurisdiction of Administrative Agencies. In addition to
the Interstate Commerce Act's language as interpreted by the
Commission and the Court and the analogy of administratively
enforceable duties in other statutes, the doctrine of "primary
administrative jurisdiction" and its policy of uniform application of
expertise to complex regulatory issues call for a finding of ICC
jurisdiction to enforce the section 1(4) duty. Precedent exists that
administrative statutes should be interpreted and applied by their
respective commissions and agencies, not by the courts, even in the
absence of express authority to do so. The Supreme Court has
rejected court enforcement of the Federal Power Act provision
requiring reasonable rates, holding that the concept of
"reasonableness" can be made specific only by the Commission's
judgment, and that the "prescription of the statute is a standard for
the Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action,
creates no rights which courts may enforce."'' Of course, the
Commission endorsed direct judicial enforcement of section 1(4) in
Sunset-Adequacies. Considering the complexities of modern
transportation problems, the "reasonableness" of transportation
services could be better determined by the Commission than by the
courts because of the agency's experience, expertise, and
information-gathering capabilities 7 0 A district court expressed a
similar view when it commented that "[t]he [Interstate Commerce]
Commission was given power to consider specified violations of the
statutes and technical questions requiring expert knowledge and
skill."'' This desire to apply expertise to administrative problems
167. Federal Aviation Act § 406, 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 49
U.S.C. § 1376 (1964). See generally Hall, The Civil Aeronautics Board Policy Favoring
Subsidy Reduction to Local Service Carriers:Its Role and Implementation in the Decisional
Process, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 577-84 (1968).
168. See Hearings 213, 239-40; Brief for Southern Pac. Co. at 99, Sunset-Adequacies, 335
I.C.C. 415 (1969). See note 212 infra and accompanying text.
169. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,251 (195 1).
170. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
171. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475,497 (D.
Ore. 1953).
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and the concomitant aim of uniformity have contributed to the
development of the so-called "doctrine of primary jurisdiction,"
applied by the Supreme Court in United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad" 2 as the basis for its affirmative response to the
Government's argument that a suit concerning reasonable tariff
rates should be suspended pending ICC resolution of the reasonable
tariff issue. The Court fully recognized that the "maintenance of aproper relationship between the courts and the Commission in
matters affecting transportation policy was of continuing public
concern ...

1.73

The Court connected the applicability of the

doctrine to a situation where a claim was originally cognizable in a
court, but where enforcement required the resolution of issues within
the special competence of an administrative body and suggested that
the standards for application would simply be uniformity and need
for expertise.'74 Such an interpretation of the doctrine should be
applied to the situation exemplified by Sunset-A dequacies to require
Commission'determination of the issue of adequacy of passenger
service. In light of modern transportation complexities, court
enforcement of the ICC interpretation should often be automatic 75
since ICC expertise on complex transportation matters cannot easily
be ignored.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the primary
jurisdictiondoctrine to a section 1(4) action in Spence v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad,7 ' where an elevator company attempted to compel
a railroad to furnish box cars. The district court had enforced by a
mandatory injunction the duty to provide transportation upon
reasonable notice, but the court of appeals held that the ICC must
be given an opportunity to fulfill its administrative functions before
the duty could be judicially enforced and consequently ruled that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction 7 7 If Spence
and Sunset-Adequacies are both correctly decided, one desiring to
enforce the railroad's duty under section 1(4) is left in a rather
awkward procedural posture. He cannot go directly to the
Commission nor can he obtain direct action from the courts, but he
172. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).

173. Id. at 63.
174. Id. at 63-64.
175. See generally 2 SHARFMAN 385-93.
176. 360 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1966).
177. Id. at 888,890-91.
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must reach the Commission through the courts and in turn pray for
court enforcement of the Commission decision. The excessive delay
inherent in such a circuitous process is intolerable in a situation
demanding reasonably quick response to a rapidly changing
transportation envir6nment.
This inefficiency should be avoidable, for the applicability of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to the Interstate Commerce Act is
well-established.178 In Elgin Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville
1 7' a district
Railroad
court applied the doctrine to an attempt to
obtain a mandatory injunction enforcing the general car service
provision"and noted that the doctrine had originally developed under
the Interstate Commerce Act. Therefore, the court refused to assume
jurisdiction over the controversy prior to a decision by the
Commission, considering the reasonableness of rail service as a
question demanding administrative experience, knowledge, and
discretion."' It seems clear that the Commission at least has the
jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of.passenger service. Though
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as previously applied is
inapplicable to the issue of ultimate enforcement by the
Commission, it certainly negates the Commission's pronouncements
in Sunset-Adequacies that it lacked'all jurisdiction over the issue of
adequacy of railroad passenger service.
Enforcement of the Duty to ProvideSafe and Adequate Car Service
Section 1(21). The duty placed upon carriers in section 1(11) to
furnish "safe and adequate car service" is expressly made subject to
Commission enforcement in section 1(21), giving the ICC power
after a hearing upon a complaint or its own initiative to "require
by order any carrier by railroad . . . to provide itself with safe and
adequate facilities for performing as a common carrier its car
service . .
"181 The Commission has acknowledged its power to
enforce section 1(11) under sections 1(14) and 1(15) of the Act.182 Of
178. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907). See generally
2 SHARMAN 393-406.
179. 277 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Tenn.), affd, 411 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1967). See note 55 supra
and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. InterstateCommerceAct § 1(21),49 U.S.C. § 1(21) (1964).
182. Train Service on Line ofN. Pac. Ry., 112 I.C.C. 191,193 (1926).
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course, the utility of this clear-cut enforcement power for railroad
passenger interests is dependent upon the term "car service"
including passenger facilities, a position as previously noted, which
is far from fanciful or untenable.'
Emergency Enforcement of the Car Service Duty. Section 1(15)
gives the Commission broad power upon determination that an
"emergency" exists to act unilaterally and "suspend the operation
of any or all rules, regulations, or practices then established with
respect to car 'service" and "make such just and reasonable
directions with respect to car service

. . .

as in its opinion will best

promote the service in the interest of the public and the commerce
of the people .

.

. ."I" This section was used to curtail passenger

85 where the
service in Heflin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad'
Commission had found an emergency to exist as to the availability
of locomotive-fuel coal and ordered carriers without a dependable
source of supply to reduce their passenger service by 25 percent?
A consumer adversely affected by the reduced commuter service
challenged the ICC's authority to issue that order because it dealt
directly with the use of passenger trains or services, activity allegedly
1 7 The Commission disagreed,
not within the car service provisions.Y
citing, inter alia, section l(15)'s emergency powers and section
I (10)'s definition of car service as the bases for such a regulation.'"
Although the Commission did not hold that "car service" includes
passenger service, one can infer from the opifiion' 8" that whenever
passenger service has a "direct bearing" on freight service, at least
during an emergency, the Commission can regulate it. Since such a
direct freight-passenger relationship is almost always present,
especially where financial expenditures are involved, the ICC can
regulate passenger service under 1(15) when appropriate.
But does the present railroad passenger situation constitute an
emergency which would authorize the ICC to promulgate directions
183. See notes 61-70 supra and accompanying text.
184. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(15),49 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1964).
185. 278 I.C.C. 737 (1950).

186. Id.at 740.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Since the service orders complained of concerned the supply of locomotives
and the regulation of defendant's practices as to the use of coal-burning passenger
service locomotive mileage, and had a direct bearing on the ability of the defendant to
carry property during a national emergency, we conclude that they were fully
authorized by the [Interstate Commerce Act]. Id.at 741 (emphasis added).
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concerning passenger service? It has been held that since the ICC
derives its authority to determine the existence of an emergency from
Congress, the term "emergency" must be viewed in its legislative
sense to include "those situations where the common good or public
interest is legislatively declared to be paramount to individual
interests."' " A shortage of freight cars for the lumber industry has
been held to constitute an "emergency""'; since the Commission has
admitted that the passenger transportation problem "should be
brought under federal regulation""' and has conceded that the
problem "appears to have passed beyond the regulatory capabilities
of the individual States,"' s grounds for declaring an emergency
seem present. Such a determination is "not subject to judicial review
upon its merits," but only upon a showing of motivation by "fratd,
wrong doing or capriciousness"" so that an ICC determination that
the present railroad passenger service situation is an emergency
would be both final and appropriate.
If federal legislation is needed, apart from the emergency
provision, the interim before passage of such legislation would, seem
to be as much an "emergency" as the shortage of freight cars to
carry lumber. This would be an ideal remedy since the ICC could
act immediately to preserve passenger service while the requisite
legislative procedures were being performed by Congress.
Admittedly, the utility of this section for the present problem
depends upon a broad definition of "car service" to include
passenger service but, as stated previously, precedent exists in both
the "car service" and emergency provision cases for such
application? '
Enforcement of the Duty to Avoid Undue or Unreasonable
PreferentialTreatment of ParticularDescriptions of Traffic
Section 3(1), forbidding the giving of any "undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company

. . .

or.

.

.particular description of traffic,""' has been

recognized as applicable to passenger service and within the primary
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Daugherty Lumber Co. v. United States; 141 F. Supp. 576,581 (D. Ore. 1956).
Id. at 576.
335 I.C.C. 432.
Id.
141 F. Supp. at581.

195. See notes 185-89 supra and accompanying text.
196. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction of the Commission. In 1956 the Commission declared
that it had "assumed authority also over matters of preference and

prejudice in passenger service under the provisions of section 3 of the
act.' 1 97 Historically, the provision has been used by Negro plaintiffs

in segregation-in-transportation cases.'98 For example, the Supreme
Court has recognized that section 3(l) forbids dividing dining cars

by race with a disparate number of seats for whites1s The analogous
Motor Carrier Act provision2°° has been used by the Supreme Court
to invalidate segregation in an interstate bus terminal, 20 ' and the

Court, mentioning that section 3(1) was equivalent to the Motor
Carrier Act provision for the purpose of that particular case,
commented that "[t]he Interstate Commerce Act . . . uses language
of the broadest type to bar discriminations of all kinds. '20 2 The

Illinois Supreme Court, citing a long line of precedent,20° has
concluded that "the determination of whether or not a rule or

practice of an interstate carrier is discriminatory or unduly
preferential lies exclusively with the Interstate Commerce
Commission .... ,,201 Such strong precedent for ICC primary
jurisdiction makes section 3(1) a viable vehicle for a party seeking a
remedy through Commission action. Since a carrier under section

3(1) is forbidden to give a "preference or advantage to any
particular . . . description of traffic" and since freight and

passenger service are two particular descriptions of traffic,2°5 section
3(1) is a most appropriate remedy for passenger representatives
197. New Jersey & N.Y. R.R. Operation of Passenger Train in New Jersey, 299 I.C.C. 41,
46 (1956) (emphasis added).
198. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 US. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States,
313 U.S. 80 (1941); East Crosby v. St. L.-S.F. Ry., 112 I.C.C. 239 (1926).
199. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
200. It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person . . . or description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever, or to subject any particular person . . . or description of traffic to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever. . . . Motor Carrier Act § 216(d), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1964).
201. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
202. Id. at457.
203. General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940);
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 304 (1913); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247 (1913); Robinson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 U.S. 506
(1912); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
204. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Illinois Commerce Comm. 2 Ill. 2d 382, 391, 118 N.E.2d 435,
439, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 823 (1954).
205. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
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desiring to challenge the downgrading of passenger service in favor
of freight traffic."
BEYOND

Sunset-A dequacies

A Lost Opportunity to Enforce Section 1(4)
Among the many alternative sources of ICC enforcement power
in the area of passenger service standards, the most readily
applicable is section 1(4). Significant precedent exists for ICC
enforcement of section 1(4)'s duty to provide transportation. The
least that can be said is that the precedent for non-enforcement is
limited and weak. Since the ICC's investigation into the adequacy
of Southern Pacific passenger service in Sunset-Adequacies was
procedurally novel, 20 7 it was an appropriate time for the
Commission, if it sincerely recognized today's serious rail passenger
problems, to exercise its inherent flexibility and substantial freedom
from the stricture of resjudicataand stare decisis.20 8 A commentator
has emphasized the Commission's practice of independent
examination of each controversy before it and general reluctance to
foreclose analysis because of prior determinations0" If the ICC had
applied such a philosophy in Sunset-Adequacies, mechanical reliance
on Pennsylvania Railroad0 would have been impossible. In SunsetAdequacies. the Commission showed little, if any, dynamism by
rejecting jurisdiction to enforce adequate passenger service. Since it
ostensibly recognized the problem and subsequently reaffirmed its
earlier request for congressional action,211 the Commission either
206. Section 12(1) could be employed to enforce 3(l) since it authorizes the ICC to enforce
the railroad provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act by seeking the aid of a United States
attorney to prosecute in an appropriate court. 49 U.S.C. § 12(l) (1964). Section 8 could be
utilized by aggrieved passengers to obtain damages in court. 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
207. Cf. Brief for California Public Utility Commission at 4, Sunset-Adequacies, 335
I.C.C. 415 (1969). Apparently, this is the first case where the Commission has acted on its
own motion in the passenger service area. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
208. 2 SHARFMAN 367.
209. Id.
210. See notes 136-45 supra and accompanying text.
211. 335 I.C.C. at 437; H.R. 14170, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); Hearings49, 330, 338.
The bill by no means gives the ICC jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of intercity rail
passenger service since the only new service power in the bill is limited to two years following
the passage of the bill and is only applicable to the last remaining passenger train on a line.
It is identical to a bill introduced in 1968 based on Commission recommendations. For
discussion of another bill substantially identical see note 213 infra and accompanying text.
The fact that the ICC had sought remedial legislation, however weak. before SunsetAdequacies supports an inference that the agency was precommitted to reject the state
commissions' arguments.
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must consider itself totally bound to whatever fragile balance of
precedent it perceives or must have some ulterior motive in delaying
a meaningful response to the passenger problem. If the Commission
is indeed such a child of precedent, its utility as a quasi-legislative
body is questionable. If Commission action is the product of some
ulterior motive it could only be one in favor of railroad management
interests since further delay in applying remedial measures and
prolongation of the passenger agony can only contribute to the
ultimate extinction of the passenger train. A possible third
explanation of the decision is that the Commission declined
jurisdiction not because of legal precedent and analysis, but because
of a genuine belief that the carriers would be subjected to financial
disaster if required to provide adequate passenger service. In SunsetAdequacies the Southern Pacific claimed passenger losses ranging
from $54 million in 1954 to $16 million in 1966.12 The Commission
may have relied on the vagueness and imprecision of the Interstate
Commerce Act to avoid ordering the carriers into financial ruin and
precipitating a national economic disruption. If so, the ICC's
implicit financial analysis should be revealed in order to attract
expert criticism from all sides of the passenger service problem. The
statutory grant of jurisdiction to the ICC to require adequate
passenger service will provide little help if the problem is essentially
financial.
ProposedFederalLegislation
Perhaps Sunset-Adequacies, even if legally incorrect, was a good
decision, for it has emphasized the need for legislative action.
Renewed congressional interest is evident in the introduction of new
legislation and more serious consideration of bills previously
introduced.
FinancialAssistance for the Carriers. Even if one agrees that
good passenger service would be utilized by the public and be
profitable for the railroads, as shown by examples in Japan and
other countries,213 the problem still exists of providing adequate
service now with presently inadequate passenger revenues. A number
of possible solutions for this financial dilemma exist. First, the
federal government could make long-term, low-interest government
212. Brief for Southern Pacific Co. at 99, Sunset-Adequacies, 335 I.C.C. 415 (1969). See
generally Hearings213, 239-40.
213. See generally Hearings 199, 229.
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loans for the purchase of necessary equipment. Second, tax
incentives for the purchase of passenger equipment might be
authorized. The Tax Reform Act of 1969's grant to railroads of the
privilege of taking accelerated depreciation on certain qualified
rolling stock21 ' should be extremely beneficial in acquiring'new
passenger equipment, and other tax benefits, such as investment
credits, could be formulated.
A third possibility overwhelmingly passed the Senate recently in
the form of a bill, substitute amendment 618 to S. 3706,21
authorizing the establishment of a National Railroad Passenger
Corporation as a profit-making enterprise owned by railroads as
original common shareholders and members of the general public as
preferred shareholders2t 6 The corporation's purpose would be to
take over all intercity passenger service, defined as "all rail
passenger service other than commuter and other short-haul service
in metropolitan and suburban areas, usually characterized by
reduced fare, multiple-ride, and commutation tickets and by
morning and evening peak period operations ....,,2*"
This purpose
would be consummated by contracting with the railroads to relieve
them of their entire passenger responsibilities and to obtain use of
existing tracks and other facilities21 8 Though the railroads would not
be required to purchase stock or contract with the new corporation,
failure to do so would automatically deny them any passenger
discontinuances until 1975 21 prohibit them from competing against
the corporation,2 20 and possibly subject them to an ICC order
requiring them to make services and facilities available to the
corporation?21 Both common stock, initially issued only to railroads,
and preferred, which will be held by the general public exclusive of
any railroads, carry voting rights and dividend eligibility rn Forty
million dollars will be contributed directly by the federal government
for initial organization and operation, improved reservations and
214. Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 705, 26 U.S.C.A. § 184 (West Supp. Pamphlet, March,
1970).
215. S.3706, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 6697-6701 (daily ed. May 6, 1970);
Washington Post, May 7, 1970, at G-l, col. 1.
216. I16CoNG. REC.6697-6701 (1970)

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 101.

§§ 401(a)(1)&402(a).
§ 404(a).
§ 401(c).
§ 402.
§ 304(a).

§

301.
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advertising, maintenance of equipment, research and development,
and essential fixed facilities.2? Private loans to the corporation will
be guaranteed by the federal-government to a maximum of $60
million,n4 and federal loans and loan guarantees to a ceiling of $75
million will be provided 2 5 With the advice and consent of the
Senate, the President would choose eight members of the 15-man
board of directors, including the Secretary of Transportation and
one consumer representative, while three members would be elected
26
by common stockholders and four by the preferred stockholders?
Corporate management would be appointed by the board? 27 The
corporation would be exempt from all state regulation of rates,
routes, or service, but would be subject to ICC directives concerning
the comfort and health of passengers on trains operating under the
direction of the corporation, such directives being supported by a
maximum civil penalty of $500 per violation per day. 2 Such
legislation offers a possibility for the immediate protection that the
railroad passenger consumer needs, but whether such an
organization would ultimately provide adequate service is still
dependent upon the standards which the ICC is willing to set.
Although the difficulty of coordinating a national railroad system
would be extensive, the ICC should be willing to exercise its direct
authority to demand adequate passenger service under legislation
providing both adequate federal financing and a clear congressional
mandate to correct present inadequacies. This recognition of both
the financial and legal portions of the rail passenger problem in one
bill offers the most comprehensive solution and for that reason, if
none other, appears to offer the best remedy.
A fourth alternative would be nationalization of the railroads,
which arguably would be the inevitable result if the ICC should
exercise the power which it presently has to require large
expenditures by refusingito discontinue certain service. Though no
current proposals seek to legislate such a solution to the problem,
both S. 275011 and H.R. 14661m would relieve the necessity for such
223. Id. § 601.
224. Id. § 602.
225. Id. § 701.

226. Id. § 303(a).
227. Id. § 303(d).
228. Id. §§ 305-06,404,§ 801.
229. S.2750,91stCong., IstSess. (1969).
230. H.R. 14661, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 13a(2) (1969). The bill also authorizes the
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an extreme measure by reimbursing a carrier for any costs over
direct passenger revenues during a period of required continuance of
a particular train. Although such a measure would help avoid
nationalization, without some provision for enforcement of adequate
service it would offer the passenger only minimal assistance.
Although nationalization has not been suggested recently,
"regionalization" has. S. 9241 endorses and encourages interstate
compacts for the creation of regional state-owned and operated
railroad passenger systems. Regional "authorities" could enter into
agreements with railroads and government agencies for the provision
of passenger services. Financing would be borne by the states on a
pro-rata passenger mileage basis and by the issuance of a maximum
of $1 billion in bonds guaranteed by the federal government at the
discretion of the Secretary of Transportation upon consultation with
the ICC. This bill, if enacted, could impede a strong national
transportation system since it fails to delineate any clear mechanism
for coordinating the separate regional authorities or any source of
authority for the enforcement of adequate service. A milder regional
proposa 232 simply encourages major geographic and economic
regions of the United States designated by the Secretary of
Transportation with the concurrence of local officials to coordinate
transportation planning within and among themselves and to engage
in research programs and demonstration projects. Federal funds
would be appropriated to support the regional efforts. But without
effective means for enforcing adequate service such regional
programs offer little more than current inadequate state efforts.
Limited Power To Enforce Passenger Service Standards. One
proposal is directed at the dilemma created when the Commission
refuses to discontinue trains because they are required by public
convenience and necessity, and the carriers respond by providing
inadequate service in hopes of eventually convincing the Commission
Secretary of Transportation to acquire passenger equipment with funds appropriated by
Congress and rent such equipment to carriers if needed by them to comply with an ICC
continuance order. Id. & 13a(4)(a) & (b). See also S. 2939 and H.R. 13352, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969). S. 674, H.R. 744, and H.R. 785, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), simply require
the ICC, in responding to a discontinuance petition, to consider the possibility of government
financial aid under existing programs. Consideration of financial aid is essential to retard the
carriers' desires to promote discontinuances and allow downgraded service.
231. S. 924, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
232. S. 2425, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also S. Con. Res. 32, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969).
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that the particular train is not required. When the ICC denies the
discontinuance of the last remaining train on a line, it would be
authorized by H.R. 12084 to
attach such recommendations to its order, requiring the continuance of the
operations or service in question, as it deems just and reasonable to assure
the preservation of a reasonable level of service for the passenger trains . . .
required, to be continued....2

But this remedy is of limited utility since it is applicable only to the
last remaining train on a line, is nascent until a carrier
discontinuance petition and negative response by the Commission,
and is drafted to expire after two years. As a negative, stop-gap
measure to delay the ultimate extinction of passenger service, H.R.
12084-S. 2887 might suffice, but it offers the Commission no general
affirmative power to respond to consumer demands for adequate
service.
Furthermore, the recommendation and requirement portions of
H.R. 12084 contrast sharply. The ICC could require only the
continued operation of the particular train while adequate service on
such trains would be permissive rather than mandatory.P4 Therefore,
the "level of service" provision is meaningless since it would lack
the "teeth of an enforceable condition

."23

The companion

bill, S. 2887,238 is properly responsive to this deficiency, for it
replaces "recommendations" in the House bill with "conditions,"
apparently making the ICC directions mandatory.
These bills would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation,
in cooperation with the ICC and other federal agencies, to prepare
a study concerning the potential for railroad passenger service. H.R.
12084, which requires the study to be submitted to both the House
and Senate Commerce Committees within one year, directs the
Secretary to focus on six areas: general resources within the United
States for meeting passenger transportation needs; anticipated
expansion of those resources by 1975; expected passenger needs from
1975 to 1985; ability of existing resources expanded by current
programs to meet needs until 1975; ability of improved railroad
passenger service to meet anticipated needs until 1975; and carrier233. H.R. 12084, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see Hearings6-7.
234. The ICC interprets the bill simply to authorize recommendations for adequate service,
a position commensurate with the view that only the continuation of operations would be
mandatory. Hearingsat 118.
235. Id.
236. S 2887, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)
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government cooperation, particularly financial, in developing
adequate service.3 7 Such a study would be helpful, if not essential,
for long-range planning but offers no aid in facing the immediate
threat of extinction of railroad passenger service.
Direct Authority to Promulgate Standards for Adequate
Passenger Service. H.R. 3112 and H.R. 9168 would authorize the
Federal Railroad Administrator under the Department of
Transportation, rather than the ICC, to set "standards for the
comfort, safety, and convenience of railroad passengers."
Such
rules and regulations would take effect ninety days after publication
in the FederalRegister. The Administrator is directed to employ the
necessary personnel to assure compliance with the rules issued, with
carriers who fail to comply subject to maximum fines of $1,000 per
day per offense. This bill certainly provides the affirmative power
necessary to assure adequate service; however, it is questionable
whether such power should be lodged with the Department of
Transportation and not with the ICC. Since the discontinuance and
adequate service powers are complementary, both should be applied
by the same agency to assure consistent responses to similar
problems. Moreover, the Commission's considerable experience in
the discontinuance field warrants its exercise of the adequate service
power. Only if it proves unwilling to exercise such function should
the authority be removed.
Another proposal, H.R. 14572, and its companion bill, S. 2951,
pronounces a direct statement of the carriers' duty "to provide and
furnish reasonably adequate passenger service on any [interstate
train]' 2" and directs that in determining whether service is
"reasonably adequate," consideration be given to the operating
condition of equipment, the provision of pullman and dining cars
237. Id. at 9-10. See also id. at 20-22, 23-25, 32-34, 35-38, 39-43, 60, and 103-05 for
another proposed study.
238. H.R. 3112, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1969); H.R. 9168, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Since the Federal Railroad Administration is an
executive branch planning body, it is doubtful that it has the expertise to determine the proper
internal management of a passenger railroad. It also lacks the power to provide any direct
enforcement of its policies. Section 201 of S. 3706, before its recent amendment and Senate
passage, note 221 and accompanying text supra. had authorized the Secretary of
Transportation, presumably with the advice of the Federal Railroad Administration, to
establish and enforce adequate passenger service standards. But the amended bill, section 801,
lodged such power with the ICC. One can infer that the Senate deemed the Commission better
equipped to handle such a legislative-judicial function.
239. H.R. 14572, S. 2951, 91st Cong., IstSess. § 1 (1969).
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where appropriate, the maintenance of adequate comfort, the
availability of sufficient equipment to accommodate normal
demands, and the provision of adequate schedule information 40 The
Commission could investigate passenger service adequacy upon
complaint or at its own initiative and after hearings could establish
standards and enforce them. This bill obviously is a direct response
to Sunset-Adequacies and provides the ICC the affirmative power
said lacking. The "reasonably adequate" standard seems a little
weak since anything less than adequate should be unacceptable, but
the statement of factors to consider and the separate use of the term
"adequate" to describe both comfort and schedule information are
strong indicators that the standard would essentially be one of
adequacy. An apparent criticism of this bill is that trains primarily
performing local commuter service would be exempt from ICC
regulation,241 but since such exception is limited to local commuter
service, the Commission would still have authority over non-local,
interstate commuter trains. Unfortunately, "local" is not defined in
the bill, thereby raising the question as to how long a distance an
interstate commuter train must travel to be non-local. Since
Congress could exercise its plenary power under the Commerce
Clause and regulate all aspects of commuter service as an
"appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end . . to
regulate interstate commerce 2 42 and produce an effective national
transportation policy, such an indefinite limited use of congressional
power is unjustified and only offers an additional defense to ICC
action.
Another bill, instead of promulgating a new duty to provide
adequate service, would simply amend section 1(4y 43 by deleting
"transportation" and substituting "adequate transportation for
both property and passengers, ' 2"4 4 an action necessary since
Commission acceptance of 1(4)'s applicability to passenger service
in Sunset-A dequacies might not be accepted by the courts or
affirmed by the Commission in a proceeding where the point was not
240. Id. § 2.
241. Id. § 3.
242. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). Financial assistance to provide
adequate local commuter service has been considered by Congress. S. 676, S. 1032, S. 2821,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). S 2656, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), authorizes the creation of
an urban mass transportation trust fund for the assistance of state and local agencies.
243. See notes 36-43 & 13545 supra and accompanying text.
244. H.R. 13832, 91st Cong., IstSess. § 1(a) (1969).
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conceded. The bill also directly enlarges the definition of car service
to include the transportation of passengers 5 Furthermore, an effort
is made to assure Commission enforcement of 1(4) by including in
section 12(1) the direct power to enforce "all obligations and duties
imposed upon carriers under this part."us Actually, the car service
change would be sufficient to give the Commission the power to
enforce adequate passenger service. It is questionable whether the
12(l) change would enlarge the ICC's power to enforce 1(4) since
the Commission held 12(1) to be inapplicable in Sunet-A dequacies.27
A similar bill specifically directs the ICC to prescribe minimum
standards but offers no additional enforcement powers 8
As discussed above,24' the amended version of S. 3706 authorizes
the ICC to prescribe passenger standards and offers a civil penalty
for their breach. This provision would fill the alleged enforcement
void recognized in Sunset-Adequacies. The Commission would have
the necessary authority it says it lacks to respond to the passenger
problem. The above bills collectively offer an effective remedial
apparatus to attempt to solve the present railroad passenger
problem, but, of course, much of the effort would have been
unnecessary if the Commission had responded, as it could have, with
affirmative action in Sunset-Adequacies. Still, some of the
legislation, particularly the financial assistance, would be valuable in
preserving railroad passenger service even if the Commission had
taken the opposite position in Sunset-Adequacies. If the case
stimulates such legislation, it will have had a significant impact.
CONCLUSION

As stated earlier, it has been a basic assumption of this analysis
that railroad passenger service is worth saving. If so, the legal tools
for such salvation are presently available. The Commission could
have acted upon authority at least as substantial as that which they
245. Id. § 2.
246. Id. § 5.Title IV of S. 3706, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), is substantially identical to
H.R. 13832, adding only a broad class of potential denlandants of adequate transportation

under section 1(4) to include persons, associations, municipalities, regulatory agencies, states,
state agencies, and the Secretary of Transportation and specifying that any member of such
class requesting adequate transportation will reimburse the carrier for avoidable costs above
the revenues derived from supplying the service. Id. § 401.

247. See notes 30,35 supra and accompanying text.
248. H.R. 13938, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

249. See note 227 supra and accompanying text.
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adopted and enforced section 1(4). A successful action probably
could be brought under section 3(1) by passenger interests against
an obvious discrimination between descriptions of traffic. The "car
service" provisions could be interpreted to apply to passenger
service. Congress may act soon to moot the controversy and assure
remedial power in the ICC. But even if the public and the Congress
should decide that railroad passenger service is simply not worth
salvage, until present laws are modified the intentional downgrading
of passenger service in violation of present law should not be either
acquiesced in or tolerated. If railroads are a realistic alternative to
airplanes, buses, and automobiles in high congestion urban
corridors, their propensity for reducing congestion and pollution
should not be ignored. The ICC, not the courts, has the expertise to
analyze railroad passenger potentialities and to apply the Interstate
Commerce Act in the most reasonable manner to promote the best
national transportation policy. The Commission should act, with or
without new legislation, to preserve the remnants of railroad
passenger service, at least until a proper analysis of the anticipated
costs and benefits of such service can be made.

